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Justifying Debate as “Cerebral Gymnastics” and 
as “Glorification of the Experience of Play”: An 
Alternative to William Hawley Davis’s Rejection of 
the “Debate as Gaming” Vision for Debate1 
 
Matt P. Brigham
 
William Hawley Davis’s “Is Debate Primarily A Game?” (1916) represents an early, prominent 
effort to justify academic, intercollegiate debate and also, indirectly, societal debate. Davis 
sharply rebukes those who would conceptualize and/or practice academic debate as if it were a 
game, arguing instead for a version of debate that more closely approximates real democratic 
deliberation and thus cultivates the training necessary for meaningful public participation on 
serious issues. This essay explores other possible justifications for debate, including those that 
might re-claim play, game, and/or sport. Such alternatives suggest the importance of conceiving 
debate beyond tragic frames and Platonic Truth claims, in ways that might better envision the 
possibilities of debate and therefore provide strong public justifications for debate as academic 
activity and as democratic practice.  
 
 
Keywords: Justifying Debate, Gaming and Play, Tragic and Comic Framing, Argumentation, Forensics  
 
rom the earliest beginnings, including but not limited to ancient Greece in the time of the 
Sophists, those connected with practices of academic/intellectual and/or societal debate 
have sought to conceptualize and justify the value of such activities. Changes in formal 
academic debate and in the role of debate in broader society have prompted the need, 
from time to time, to “give an account of oneself” (Butler, 2001; Butler, 2005), or in this case, of 
debate, both as intercollegiate contest and as societal, democratic activity.  
 William Hawley Davis’s “Is Debate Primarily A Game” (1916) represents one of these 
prominent historical moments, though neither the first nor the last, where such a justification for 
the activity of intercollegiate academic debate, and indirectly of debate in American society, is 
offered. Davis’s essay, placed among the earliest pages of what was then the new Quarterly 
Journal of Public Speaking and what is now the Quarterly Journal of Speech, offers an argument 
toward fellow debate educators and scholars, and indirectly to the broader academic and 
American communities, regarding the proper role of debate, and as a corollary, the types of 
practices that should be valued in such debate. Though Davis is talking about intercollegiate 
debating contests, his essay cannot be isolated in such neat categories, as he explicitly joins into 
                                                     
1 A previous version of this essay was presented at the 2016 National Communication Association 
convention in Philadelphia, PA. 
F 
2
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol54/iss1/4
Debate as Cerebral Gymnastics 
Page | 72 
a broader public conversation with the likes of Theodore Roosevelt regarding debate’s value and 
role, a conversation that is never only about academic debating contests.  
 Since the publication of Davis’s influential essay, many writings have offered competing 
justifications for debate, which carry implications for how debate should look and operate, and 
which are also connected with the popular conversations about debate at the time. Similarly, 
since Davis’s (1916) essay, a number of scholars have explored notions of play and gaming with 
regard to debate and forensics from historical (Bartanen & Littlefield, 2014, pp. 211-239), 
sociological (Fine, 2000; Fine, 2001), ethical (Snider, 1992), and many other perspectives. 
Davis’s essay primarily seeks to craft a compelling justification for the activity of academic 
debating, and his focus is not on conducting any kind of systemic ethnographic or rhetorical 
analysis of texts, such as specific contest debates. Such aspects are woven into his argument, but 
his essay is more of an articulation of the value of debate than an empirical examination of 
particular practices manifesting in contest debates during his time. Similarly, my essay focuses 
on Davis’s vision and justification, as a way of imagining what alternative academic and public 
justifications for debate might be possible. In part, this essay does so by asking, based on 
information available, why Davis and others think debaters are drawn to the activity, and how 
that relates to how debaters themselves report their motivations for participating in debate. To 
the degree that the rationale guiding debaters is out of synch with the one crafted in public 
justifications, such as that provided by Davis, it may suggest the need to explore, re-frame, and 
re-invent the stories and justifications used to ground and legitimate academic debate. This 
inquiry may also suggest a need to re-imagine how debate is envisioned on the level of societal 
debate and how the example of academic debate could suggest another path for justifying a 
different kind of public, societal debate.  
As Gehrke and Keith (2015) note in their history of the National Communication 
Association, understanding such history is important because “it can illuminate the past as well 
as the present. . . . at the end of an era, it becomes possible to understand assumptions and 
patterns invisible to those who made the history” (p. 1). Thus, listening to, working to 
understand, and critically analyzing and evaluating the words of Davis may help to better survey 
the range of possibilities, previously utilized and imagined alternatives, in terms of offering 
visions of the possibilities and justifications for academic debate, including what is entailed by 
considering whether to conceptualize debate as play, sport, or game. 
 This essay proceeds in the following steps. First, a number of preliminary definitions and 
distinctions are advanced, including in terms of definitions of and varieties within gaming, as 
well as a discussion of types of debate, in order to guide the overall arc of the essay. Second, the 
major arguments that Davis (1916) delivers are presented and described. Third, Davis’s vision of 
and justification for debate is subjected to critique, considering what his vision of and 
justification for debate highlights and downplays, and what other visions and justifications could 
be developed as alternatives, including whether the language of gaming and the preference for a 
comic rather than tragic framing might provide a meaningful alternative. While in part such 
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visions of and justifications for debate are time-dependent, in other ways they possess a 
relatively timeless appeal. For instance, one could read Davis’s essay alongside the arguments of 
his primary interlocutor, J. M. O’Neill, in 2016, one hundred years later, and observe substantial 
overlaps between visions of and justifications for debate offered in 1916 and 2016. Indeed, when 
Llano (2017) examined the debate between Davis and J. M. O’Neill over the role of debate, he 
reminded us that, “Although competitive debate in 1916 differed in many ways from today’s 
debate, both grappled with many of the same issues,” (p. 2) to which might be added, not just 
practices and issues like judging, as Llano indicates, but similar issues with justifying the activity 
itself. Finally, implications and contributions are offered.  
On Gaming 
 In considering the varieties of visions of and justifications for debate, as examined 
through the words of Davis, the role of gaming is important. Thus, this essay explores the 
various ways that gaming has been understood in the past, and begins to imagine and reflect on 
the horizon of possibilities in which both gaming and debate could be considered moving 
forward. To provide some starting points, this section first considers definitions of gaming and 
the scholarship of gaming, and then differentiates genuine and disingenuous gaming, generally 
and regarding debate.  
Gaming and Play as Areas of Academic Scholarship 
 Most scholarship today that discusses “games” and/or “play” does so in relation to highly 
particularized and technological practices, such as video games and computer games (Torner, 
Trammell, & Waldron, 2014). Such scholarship analyzes computer gaming and video games as, 
among other things, sites of technological, social, and/or cultural practice (Aarseth, 2001). 
Potentially lost in this contemporary narrowing of the field is a much older scholarly trajectory 
that seeks to understand games, play, and often sport as well, not in terms of any particular 
activity or accompanying technology, but in terms of the functions that they fulfill for the human 
condition (Mäyrä, 2006). Such scholarship has attended to gaming and play from numerous 
disciplinary approaches, including psychology, sociology, and anthropology, producing an 
important and rich body of academic insights (e.g., Sutton-Smith, 1980; Sutton-Smith & Roberts, 
1981).  
 There is not, however, a consensus view about how to define or understand games and 
play. As Murray (2006) notes, there remains a “notorious difficulty of defining games” (p. 187) 
while play is an “even more contested category” (p. 187). Indeed, as Murray (2006) reports, the 
renowned philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein saw “games as exemplary of how messy linguistic 
categories are” (p. 192). Similarly, Juul (2001) works through a variety of attempts to define 
games and play, indicating the never-ending problems that such academic clarifications 
encounter. Nevertheless, Juul (2001) gives particular credit to the work of Sutton-Smith in the 
area of game and play studies, and Sutton-Smith and Roberts (1981) offer one persuasive 
account for gaming and play, in this more historically and culturally situated understanding of 
play, games, and sports:  
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 Play is a subset of voluntary behaviors in which the individual reverses the usual 
 relationships of power (e.g., a child is in charge of a situation), by enacting prototypical 
 behavior patterns in a vivid manner. Games are a subset of play, in which a rule-governed 
 system of competitive behavior results in one side winning the competition. Sports are a 
 subset of games, in which, in addition to the main participants, other individuals 
 participate vicariously. (p. 426) 
In the present essay, justifications for and imaginings of debate are explored, using this full range 
of meanings. Based on these definitions, a few particularly important characteristics seem to be 
clearly established. First, play is something that is voluntary, rather than coerced or mandated. 
Thus, anyone participating has made the choice to spend time on this activity rather than another. 
Second, play and games offer the opportunity to explore and even re-cast power relationships. 
For instance, role-playing as institutional agents, as policy debaters often do when acting as 
though they were representing the United States federal government, offers an opportunity for 
perspective-taking that exceeds the debater’s own subject position and degree of personal and 
political power. Third, games suggest competition, with an end result that is generally either a 
win or a loss, and the idea of some type of rules or norms that shape a common experience for 
those playing. Fourth, as suggested in this essay, play might also be understood as a kind of spirit 
or motivation that leads people to want to take part in games and sports, even if they know they 
might not win. For instance, as Poulakos (1995) suggests, the Sophists identified rhetoric as 
being a form of playfulness: “one plays not only for a victory but also for the pleasure inherent in 
playing” (p. 65). Finally, those games that have formal audiences and/or “fans,” who can 
vicariously feel as though they are participating from afar, may be termed sports. However, even 
games like debate, which have very small immediate audiences, can still have other actors (such 
as other department members and those in university administrations, politicians, and those in 
the media) following, monitoring, and even possibly surveilling what occurs within debate, ready 
to intervene should there be concerns. Thus, this work by Sutton-Smith and Roberts, 
supplemented with accounts by those such as Poulakos, offer a starting point, all while keeping 
in mind that, since there is no uniformly agreed upon definition for any of these terms, other 
meanings are also possible. 
 While the preceding definitions and characteristics provide a broader landscape with 
which to consider play, games, and sports, additional theorizing is necessary to understand the 
ways in which these categories, and gaming in particular, become subject to criticism and even 
scorn. Thus, what follows is an attempt to differentiate genuine from disingenuous gaming, 
without at this point narrowing such reflections to any particular game or activity itself.  
Genuine and Disingenuous Gaming 
 The previously stipulated definitions of play, gaming, and sport do not seem to be 
particularly controversial, though the criticisms of game-based approaches to any number of 
social activities are plentiful and often delivered forcefully. Thus, what might account for the 
division between games, which appear good on their own terms, and a gaming model, which 
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seems fraught with suspicion and potential corruption? In part, such suspicion may relate to the 
extension of characteristics of games, play, and sports, by way of metaphor and analogy, to other 
spheres of human activity where they might not neatly and/or appropriately transfer. For 
instance, discussing politics or war using the language of gaming may strike audiences as an 
inappropriate over-extension. In part, however, what seems to make such extensions problematic 
is not necessarily anything tied to the defining characteristics of a “game” itself, but rather to the 
use and abuse of those who play games. 
 I account for this phenomenon, of those who undermine the game based on how they 
approach and play it, by offering a distinction between genuine and disingenuous gaming. 
Genuine gaming, as defined here, relates to those core characteristics of gaming previously 
described: a competition with a clear outcome, a set of rules or norms that provide a basic 
structure by which to play the game, an activity done by choice that examines and plays with 
notions of power, and one that may or may not have a fan base, but likely has agents who 
participate vicariously, if nothing else to monitor and intervene if problems arise, either in day 
to day competition or in the larger vision/trajectory of the game itself. And perhaps, most 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, those who seek to play games genuinely are 
characterized by a spirit of play that necessarily includes a sense of anticipation and joy in 
partaking of the game, regardless of whether or not they amass trophies or win more frequently 
than they lose.  
 What, then, differentiates whether someone plays a game in a disingenuous way? While 
there is no ultimate, hard and fast distinction, clues reside in implicit contrasts to what makes 
gaming good. First, whereas genuine gaming may initially attract, and even retain, participants 
due to competition and more specifically competitive success, defined in the narrowest sense as 
“winning” the game more frequently than “losing” it, it is only in disingenuous gaming that all 
other purposes for gaming are subordinated to the overarching commitment to trophies and 
competitive success, particularly in such a way that one might regret years of dedication to a 
game if the final conclusion of one’s playing career does not end in instrumental victory. 
Because of the unhealthy dependence on victory, victory often becomes victory at all costs, 
where cutting corners becomes if nothing else a necessary evil in pursuit of the ultimate goal. 
Thus, whether the act be performance-enhancing drugs in athletic competitions, students of law 
and medical schools hiding readings from one another in the library, or even wiretapping the 
Watergate Hotel, the maniacal obsession with victory at all costs leads those observing such 
behavior to react with a feeling that something is very wrong, or at a minimum, bizarrely out of 
balance. Unfortunately, a certain metonymic relation may emerge, in which those who have 
abused games and gaming begin to stand in for all of those who participate in games, with the 
lesson being a strong caution against framing the most “serious” parts of the social world 
through a gaming metaphor. That is, the worst instances of disingenuous gaming, in arenas such 
as sports and politics, become so hyper-visible and criticized that people tend to forget that those 
guilty of such abuses are ultimately but a small subset of those involved in such games.  
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 If one part of the focus of this essay concerns the nature and abuses of gaming and play, a 
closely related element relates to what is referred to when “debate” is being analyzed, critiqued, 
proposed, and justified, in the works of Davis and others.  
On Justifying “Debate” 
 In 1916, the many types of and organizations housing debate were not at all like they are 
now. Thus, Davis would not have had to specify a particular kind of debate or an organization 
housing those competitions when making his critique. However, in the century since, an 
elaborate infrastructure has arisen, with many different kinds of debate and many debate 
organizations as well, suggesting a substantially changed scene for engaging in, envisioning and 
justifying, and/or exploring in scholarship aspects of debate. 
 In another way, though, there are important similarities, including that, whether in 1916 
or 2016, the boundaries between public debate and academic competitive debate have always 
been more permeable than they might at first seem. For instance, in 1916, Davis and his 
colleagues were still attempting to respond to the forceful critiques made by President Theodore 
Roosevelt against the practice of “switch sides” debate as had become prominent, in part to make 
tournament competitions possible. Thus, when Davis (1916) opens his essay with the words, 
“Debating is under fire” (p. 171), he means not only within the academy, but also throughout 
society, while his own model for intercollegiate debate, “counterfeit presentment” (Davis, 1916; 
Llano, 2017), aims to make debate operate as “an approximation of actual conditions, of ‘real 
life,’” (Davis, 1916, p. 173), thus again blurring the tidy distinctions between type of competitive 
intercollegiate debate and the model for societal debate.  
In 1954, the boundaries again blurred, as the national policy debate topic was about 
whether the U.S. should recognize Communist China, and many universities including the 
service academies refused to or were not permitted to take part. This became another moment in 
which intercollegiate debate and societal debate became mutually implicated and where the 
borders of each became less precise and absolute (English et al., 2007). And most recently, in the 
2016 presidential election, the lines attempting to neatly characterize competitive and 
public/societal debate were crisscrossed. For instance, the debate over whether Ted Cruz had 
been a “good debater” in college became an enduring topos in the election analysis, but despite 
attempts by those in the debate community to specify the type of debate he did, often to try to 
disown him, the media and the public were not at all concerned with such distinctions. Moreover, 
those in various parts of the debate community were called in to advise how one might debate 
against Donald Trump, under the assumption that what “works” in competitive academic debate 
has some crossover appeal in the realm of public, societal debate. Thus, contributions to the 
public conversation began to appear, such as Aaron Kall’s edited volume Debating the Donald 
(2016), whose selections were written completely by those with expertise in intercollegiate 
debate, offering advice to those in the public sphere as to how to engage in societal debate 
against Trump.  
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Thus, on the one hand, a study focused on individual debate contests at intercollegiate 
tournament sites during any time in the last several decades suggests grounded practices that 
look and sound very different, depending on the sponsoring forensics organization and the type 
of debate being adjudicated. However, the vision, purposes, and justifications for debate, 
specifically in the intercollegiate setting but indirectly in terms of societal debate, suggest that 
for these purposes any such boundaries, of organization or event classification, are substantially 
de-emphasized in favor of larger discussions whose apparent borders and boundaries are highly 
permeable and contingent.
12
  
 Having framed notions of gaming, types of debate, and the purpose driving the kind of 
justification for debate offered by Davis (1916), the next section offers a detailed description of 
his overall argument, followed by a critique of his position.  
Debate’s Purpose as “Dealing with Serious Affairs”: Davis’s Critique of “Debate as 
Gaming” 
The historical moment surrounding William Hawley Davis’s 1916 essay was one of 
upheaval and change. His is one of the earliest essays in the newly formed academic discipline of 
speech communication, inaugurated with the teachers of public speaking parting ways in 1914 
from their former home discipline to form their own organization—what we would now identify 
as the National Communication Association. Furthermore, this article was published in the new 
discipline’s original flagship journal, the Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, in just its second 
year of existence. Just as the academic space for public speaking teachers was very new, 
including its outlets for publishing scholarship, so too were conceptions of intercollegiate 
debating. The transition to more and more competitive approaches to debate were growing in 
Davis’s time, and the rise of the tournament model was not far behind, as it “gained popularity 
among colleges in the 1920s” (Bartanen & Littlefield, 2014, p. 49).  
Therefore, amidst an array of academic and organizational change, Davis’s essay stands 
as one of the most well developed and comprehensive of the early accounts to wrestle with this 
challenge of providing a vision of and justification for debate, particularly as an intercollegiate, 
academic activity, but more broadly for societal debate his well. His essay provides such a 
                                                     
1 The types of debate analyzed in this essay are, then, three-fold: historical debate (circa 1916), before 
such divisions of debate had become prominent; societal debate (which might be termed “public 
debate,” were it not the case that public debate is its own specific genre of debate practice in 
contemporary times); and intercollegiate/academic debate (though at the level of overarching vision, 
purpose, and justification, rather than as conceived based on particular forensics organization or 
rules/structures of specific types of debate). Nevertheless, as a basic disclosure, the author’s own 
experiences, as debate competitor, coach, judge, and scholar are grounded in policy debate in the 
NDT/CEDA tradition, and accordingly, a significant amount of the literature cited in the essay draws from 
that tradition. To avoid the assumption that any debate tradition, NDT/CEDA or otherwise, represents 
an unmarked, universal form, future scholarship could examine the ways in which discussions of 
debate’s vision, purpose, and justification might differ, even if only subtly, across numerous debate 
organizations and types.  
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justification by attending, though at times only implicitly, to three different levels of audience: 
those in debate, those who were the early public speaking teachers in the new discipline, and 
those in the public sphere, either who were raising ever greater challenges to the legitimacy of 
intercollegiate debate practices and approaches and/or those trying to figure out the broader role 
of debate in society. Among the former, Davis specifically references the loudly pronounced 
condemnations offered by Theodore Roosevelt about debate, particularly in its use of “switch 
sides” debating practices in which debaters would be asked to alternately argue for and against 
the same propositions throughout their time in competition. Therefore, while there are many 
iterations of this debate about debate, including whether it should be understood and practiced as 
a game, Davis’s essay occupies a unique intersection and constellation of competitive, 
organizational, academic, and political concerns, and his essay is one that has, since its original 
publication, continued to be cited and referenced in these ongoing debates (Atchison & Panetta, 
2009; Cox & Adams, 1993; Llano, 2017; O’Neill, 1916; Panetta et al., 2010). 
Davis and Debate’s Fork in the Road: Toward What End Should Debate Be Oriented? 
Davis (1916) argues forcefully for a shift in debating practices toward the civic, the 
practical, and the commendable, offering a sharp rebuke of those who would approach activities 
of intercollegiate debate as a game:  
One thing is certain: that, frankly accepted as a game, debating becomes a monstrous 
affair. A game is engaged in for fun; practices clearly improper in dealing with serious 
affairs, actual conditions, become permissible and even important in the realm of the 
sport; they are ‘part of the game.’ . . . Where shall the strategy of the debater begin or end 
if debating is primarily a game? . . . specious structures of argument can hardly be ruled 
out; the more cunningly specious they are, the more commendable, as the fruit of 
brilliancy and industry, they become. As participants in a game, debaters may devise 
artfully misleading arguments or wordings. (p. 175) 
Thus, for Davis, the framing of debate alongside other games ensures that it suffers the same 
troubles, yet with higher stakes, as it opens the floodgates to any tactic, however deceptive, in the 
pursuit of immediate, instrumental victory.  
Davis, throughout his essay, does at times mention specific practices in debate, but these 
are ultimately not his focus. Instead, vision of and justification for debate seem to be the guiding 
spirit behind his article: “Debating seems to me most in need of readjustment with regard to its 
aims, its ideals” (Davis, 1916, p. 172). In fact, Davis (1916) argues clearly that addressing the 
questions of vision and justification will itself translate into changes in practice: “Changing the 
ideal will change also the thing itself. But upon that aspect I shall not now enlarge” (p. 172). In 
that light, he foregrounds two visions of debate that he finds to be ultimately in tension and likely 
incompatible: debating as a game on the one hand, and debate “as training for the wise 
disposition of important factors” throughout democratic culture, in which debate is meant to 
serve as “an approximation of actual conditions, of ‘real life’” (Davis, 1916, p. 173), on the other 
hand. After elaborating the constituent elements and tendencies of each approach, and 
9
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acknowledging that these two camps are more about tendencies than pure exemplification of 
either spirit (and thus are also not mutually exclusive), Davis (1916) suggests that the stakes of 
this decision could not be higher, for debate and, by implication, for democratic society as well:  
And the leading colleges, and an organization such as this Conference, cannot too 
promptly begin to revise and improve debating ideals and practices, if this important 
means of securing effective training in speaking is to be rescued from merely a place in 
the encyclopedia of ancient and curious games and pastimes, and made what it is capable 
of being—an enduring and an honorable means of preparing citizens to participate in the 
work of living and governing, of deciding intelligently and confidently the serious 
questions which from time to time arise. (p. 179) 
Having identified the central elements of Davis’s argument, I turn next to a critique of his essay, 
examining both the potential upsides to a “gaming”-type approach to debate, while also 
suggesting limits to approaching debate as “an enduring and an honorable means” to investigate 
“serious questions.”  
Debate as Something Exhilarating, Joyful, and Fun, and Not Merely Serious and Somber: 
A Rejoinder to Davis 
This section argues that William Hawley Davis’s image of debate as serious business 
causes him to be dismissive of games and sports and ultimately misunderstands both the role and 
potentiality of debate, game, and sport.
2
3 Indeed, the focus on gaming neither helps to illuminate 
debate’s situation better nor aids in better conceptualizing games or, relatedly, sports. Ultimately, 
the somber and serious tone that structures the critique of Davis and those who make similar 
gestures serves to bracket the humanity of debate’s potential participants. As Howe (1982) 
suggests, “human beings stand alone in the animal kingdom in their ability to laugh” (p. 2). He 
suggests that “perhaps one of the cardinal sins of American educational debate has been its 
tendency to take itself too seriously,” with “the dry, uninteresting nature of the speeches” 
needing to “take some of the blame” for the fact that “the appeal of debate has waned in 
consequence” (Howe, 1982, pp. 1-2).  
By way of Davis’s (1916) presentation of the seriousness of debate as that which 
separates it from activities that are more frivolous and trivial, even “notoriously ephemeral” (p. 
174) diversions like game and sport, it might be possible to understand why people do not, in 
general, flock to see debates in action: an inattention to debates as reaching out to the entire 
human.
3
4 Whether in 1916 or 2016, one might lament the laziness of the electorate or the short 
                                                     
23 Though the focus in this essay is more about the possibilities of gaming and play, others have sought 
to expand our considerations of and even rehabilitate sport (and war) as metaphors to think about 
argumentation (Aikan, 2011).  
34 Though this analysis seems to point to specific changes in debate at different points in American 
history, I would instead suggest here that the question of seriousness and fun, broached by Davis in 
1916, is examined much later by Howe in 1982, and thus contains an important continuity. Of course, in 
the intervening years, other changes have happened, such as the rate of delivery (in terms of words per 
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attention span of young people as reasons for lack of interest and attention to debate, whether 
academic/intercollegiate or societal, but perhaps instead it might be more fruitful to think about 
what might be involved in justifying debate as something fun and enjoyable rather than endlessly 
serious. Should insights from gaming and sport aid in that reconceptualization and re-framing of 
the activity’s justification, those linked with academic trajectories of debate should not regard 
themselves as superior to or “above” such approaches.  
Gaming: Motives and Motivations 
As described earlier in this essay, genuine and disingenuous gaming can and should be 
distinguished. Any game contains participants who “con” it out of an overwhelming desire to 
win at all costs. But gaming can uniquely spur creative imagination. Indeed, Sutton-Smith (1980) 
has noted that, whereas in the past, the factory model of society minimized the value of play, 
“Today where the need for original and innovative thinkers cannot be satisfied at any level of 
government and economics, we are relatively more open to this ludic domain [play] seeking out 
new possibilities and new alternatives” (p. 10). Indeed, in this shift that Sutton-Smith (1980) 
describes, there has begun to be an examination of play’s “value in its own right” and to the 
“glorification of the experience of play” (p. 9). Davis, however, understands games in a different 
and less positive way. 
Davis (1916) makes a series of objections to the gaming model of debate. Unfortunately, 
more often than not these objections are less supported with evidence than merely assumed by 
Davis to be held already by the audience. For instance, he asks, “is there anyone . . . who can 
deny” (Davis, 1916, p. 171) the objections he poses regarding debate, and yet he has already 
                                                                                                                                                                           
minute), but by stepping back to examine controversies over vision, purpose, and justification of/for 
debate, it is possible to see more continuity than sharp break across time. In Davis’s time, debate was an 
immensely popular event with a large following: “debating is probably, next to athletics, the most widely 
practiced educational exercise in the country” (Davis, 1916, p. 171). Since then, audiences for most 
forms of intercollegiate debate have vanished, as specialization has often crowded out popular appeal. 
Despite such an apparent shift, there is a broader continuity. Witness, for instance, the excitement that 
public debates draw even now, in 2016. For instance, visits by debaters on international tours from 
places such as Great Britain, Japan, and Rwanda tend to draw large audiences on college campuses 
across the country (in fact, this is part of the context of Howe’s [1982] essay, as well as Jones’s [1994] 
essay). And the interest is not limited to international debate tours. On September 8, 2010, a public on-
campus debate at the author’s home university, James Madison University (JMU), between two JMU 
undergraduate debaters and Bruce Friedrich, former Vice President of People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals (PETA) on the topic of “Is Eating Meat Ethical?” “was attended by over 1000 members of the 
JMU, Harrisonburg and Shenandoah Valley communities” (“Past Events”, n.d.). Perhaps the fun and 
exciting nature of these events, and the interlocutors that comprise them, suggest that audiences could 
be interested in other forms of debate as well. In any case, as previously indicated, the focus of this 
essay is not to lay out a comprehensive set of particular practices (format, kind of topic, invited 
audience, etc.), but rather to interrogate visions of and justifications for debate, how those do or do not 
link with participants’ motivations to debate, and how these models/justifications inform broader 
societal notions of debate.  
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answered the question, “no sane man” (p. 171). Nevertheless, despite this strategy of argument, 
the critiques with which he most frequently leverages his criticisms seem not to bear on anything 
essential to debate itself, which could easily do without these defects and excesses. Many of 
these references are to practices unique to the time of Davis’s essay that are no longer (and 
perhaps never were) common to debate, such as certain labels for one’s debate opponents 
including “‘colleague,’ ‘preceding speaker,’ ‘our opponents’” (Davis, 1916, p. 171), using 
“artfully misleading arguments or wordings” (p. 175) and “postpon[ing] refutation” (p. 175). 
Even when such practices have continued, at least in some varied form, into the present, it begs 
the question of whether such practices are in any way part of the essence of rather than merely 
incidental to a gaming approach to debate, and thus whether the ability to provide a vision of the 
purpose for debate that can serve as a public justification for the activity rests on such actions 
being identified as essential to debate when performed as a game. Ultimately, then, the 
correspondence, or lack thereof, between Davis’s justification for and vision of debate and what 
is actually occurring in debate is not necessarily as important as tracing the terms under which he 
advocates for the activity. 
Particularly because much of the backstory of communication, debate, and argument has 
foundations in the historical practice and theory of rhetoric, debate scholars should be 
particularly concerned with this distinction between genuine and disingenuous gaming. As Keith 
(2007) reminds, regarding those who would dismiss and delegitimize rhetoric, “like any 
technology, rhetoric can be well employed or abused . . . there are many versions of rhetoric; the 
question should be which will advance our common causes and which will not” (p. 3). Similarly, 
and in the context of debate, Rieke (1968) has argued for the need to reflect, with more nuance, 
on the legitimate and warped varieties of competition. He argues that the element of competition 
in academic debate is necessary for the “sustained intellectual intensity and depth of research” 
involved, and in leading students to want to participate in forensics in the first place, noting, 
then, that “Competition, therefore, will probably remain—and should’ (Rieke, 1968, p. 68). 
Moreover, he argues that even addressing the more problematic elements of competition offer an 
important pedagogical opportunity: “learning to overcome the excesses and undesirable 
concomitants of competition is a good preparation for later life where the same struggle prevails 
with greater intensity” (Rieke, 1968, p. 68). Here, too, Rieke (1968) suggests that the problems 
of disingenuous gaming are no different for forensics than for other forms of gaming:  
As with the football coach who teaches his players to kick and punch in a pile-up, 
nothing is so disheartening as a teacher of forensics who coaches students to exploit the 
evils of competition rather than resist them. In such a case, the teacher should be 
eliminated—not competition itself.” (p. 68) 
Thus, the fact that there have always been those in games and sports who do vicious, 
underhanded things to each other is no more of an indictment than misuses of democracy to the 
concept of democracy, nor than human rights discourses manipulated to in fact deny people basic 
rights are a fatal indictment about the potential of human rights and its discourses, nor perhaps 
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most broadly than those who misuse rhetoric, argumentation, or debate thereby level any true 
condemnation on such arts.  
Additionally, an exclusive or even primary focus on winning need not be intrinsic to a 
gaming approach, nor potentially even to one rooted in sporting. Jones (1994) set out to explore, 
in the context of debate, how notions of competition and gaming might be complicated. On the 
one hand, Jones (1994) points to a set of concerns that, while not the same as those articulated by 
Davis, are generally included in critiques of the gaming model: “If winning is the sole motivating 
force behind debate, then the justification of the pedagogical benefits of debate become suspect 
to budget-conscious administrators” (p. 66). Once he identified this as a perennial concern 
voiced in the literature, Jones raised a question that would seem to short-circuit the efficacy of 
this hyper-competitive, winning-focused approach to debate: if students are only motivated based 
on winning in competition, “why do students who are not continually winning maintain 
involvement in the activity?” (Jones, 1994, p. 66). In response, Jones (1994) reasons that there 
must be something more than accumulating trophies: “Since not all debaters can win, some sort 
of additional motivation to debate must exist” (p. 66).  
 What, then, helps to account better for such motivation? In what follows, Jones explores 
a set of motivational forces that, while tied to gaming and competition, are process-oriented 
rather than product-oriented—namely, such products being ballots with wins and losses. Jones 
(1994), through the use of surveys and follow-up interviews with debaters, identified a 
compelling reason for debaters to make the sacrifices of scarce resources, such as time, money, 
and opportunities to socialize, that are virtual requirements to participate in debate: “apparently 
few other activities provide the debater the opportunity to engage in the ‘cerebral gymnastics’ 
which debate requires. By participating in the cerebral-gymnastic process, debaters receive the 
rewards necessary to encourage them to continue in the activity” (p. 70).45 Jones (1994) provides 
a more complete definition of this idea of “cerebral gymnastics,” noting that debate requires 
significant “intellectual dexterity, flexibility, and diversity” in order to “stretch, adapt, and 
change with each situation” (p. 74). In so doing, Jones (1994) ultimately ends up blocking the 
associational logics that have equated gaming with competition with an overwhelming if not 
exclusive focus on winning:  
While winning is very much a part of debate, this study indicates that winning is a 
secondary manifestation of other primary motivational factors. Debate offers individuals 
a chance to engage in an activity which they perceive as involving critical thinking skills 
which cannot be found through other avenues. . . . cerebral gymnastics may provide a 
                                                     
45  Though there has been a recent study (Mabrey & Richards, 2017) seeking to examine, among other 
things, attitudes by those in the debate community about why they participate in debate, and though 
this study developed and envisioned itself in part as an update to Jones’ work, the categories they used 
to explore motivation (“social aspects,” “competition,” “education,” “resume building,” and “forms of 
activism” [p. 44]) did not offer as an option something similar to what Jones found in the 1994 surveys 
(namely, “cerebral gymnastics”).  
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common denominator among those who chose to debate. . . . Debaters debate for a wide 
variety of reasons. This study suggested that there is a marked difference between reasons 
for debating and motivation behind those reasons. . . . Cerebral gymnastics appears to be 
the motivating force, or reward, behind debaters’ willingness to participate in an activity 
which provides very few tangible rewards. By engaging in cerebral gymnastics, debaters 
receive reinforcement that they are intelligent . . . [and they] find a great deal of 
satisfaction in that experience. (pp. 73-74) 
Thus, pointing to the worst tendencies of those in games and sports to undermine their various 
activities, even if at first it seems like their efforts are able to “succeed,” is not sufficient to 
undermine the value of games and sports as metaphor. Similarly, just because “gaming” talk has 
shown up among debate participants in explaining their motivation for involvement in the 
activity across time, in 1916 as in 2016, that does not mean that “anything for the win” is the 
unexpressed warrant for that claim. Instead, something like “cerebral gymnastics,” which is a 
valuing of process rather than a win-loss record or a trophy count, already interrupts the neat, 
clear-cut distinctions with which Davis and many others have sought to undermine the gaming 
approach to debate.  
Envisioning Debate’s Rationale Outside of the Tragic Frame 
Gaming may represent what Kenneth Burke and others have termed a comic corrective to 
the overly dramatic framing of the need for debate in academia and in a democratic society. 
Davis’s reference to debate as being not just “about jest” or “playthings,” but about “vitally 
important business,” suggests the tragic frame. Through something like a comic “argument as 
play,” gaming may re-humanize visions of and justifications for debate. Indeed, what Hariman 
(2007) argued, in defending Jon Stewart, might be capably extended to the need for a comic 
corrective for debate in society because, although differences in political culture clearly exist 
between 1916 and 2016, the sense of the precariousness of responsibility over public affairs then 
and now also suggests a fundamental similarity. Hariman (2007) claims that in contemporary 
political culture “we need a laugh” that reminds us of our “common fallibility,” “the most 
authentically democratic attitude” (p. 275). The alternative, Hariman (2007) notes, is more 
problematic, since “democratic politics should never be a search for a Redeemer” as such a quest 
“can only lead to the wrong candidates in the short run, and authoritarian rule before long” (p. 
276). Thus, he concludes, “Frankly, we all need to lighten up a bit, and here’s why: only by 
admitting to absurdity and moving through laughter can one become really serious today” 
(Hariman, 2007, p. 276).  
 Davis’s essay, in embodying a rhetorical approach that might be termed similar to a 
diatribe or a polemic, points directly to what the comic corrective was needed for in the first 
place, according to Burke and as explored by Hariman, as Davis’s argument seems bound within 
the tragic frame. For instance, Davis (1916) suggests a tone of evil/manipulation rather than 
fallibility and mistakenness on the part of those he implies are his opponents: “If in establishing 
courses in debating and encouraging debate contests our colleges have simply been indulging the 
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sporting instinct, I have been grossly deceived” (p. 174). Moreover, he explains the problems of 
debate as a game with deeply tragic expressions: “debate becomes a monstrous affair. . . . clearly 
improper in dealing with serious affairs” (Davis, 1916, p. 175). In contrast, he prefers another 
vision for debate, because “I am impressed by the reality involved in a debating contest, by the 
inescapable fact that the debate deals with truth rather than jest, with things and not with 
playthings. . . . [a] method of dealing with pressing and important affairs” (Davis, 1916, p. 177). 
Holding to the gaming model is, for Davis (1916), even “suicidal” (p. 178), and the way that he 
rests his case represents a clear-cut preference for the tragic and, following Hariman, for a 
redeemer, though in this case the savior would be an activity rather than an individual. Such 
redemption, Davis (1916) argues, is only possible if debate, as something “important,” 
“enduring,” “honorable,” and meant to decide “serious questions,” can be “rescued” from 
occupying “merely a place in the encyclopedia of ancient and curious games and pastimes” (p. 
179).   
 As indicated previously, overly serious debate, which guts the activity of affect and the 
human connection, including through humor, might actually be what is likely to relegate the 
activity to “the encyclopedia of ancient and curious games and pastimes” (Davis, 1916, p. 179). 
Notably, Burke made clear that the comic is not identical to the comedic, but perhaps 
conceptualizing and justifying debate might require some of both. I argue that is necessary to 
characterize politics, and for the purposes of this essay, debate practices and approaches to 
debate, as being about fallibility, mistakes, and errors, rather than evil sins, fools who are 
mistaken rather than villains who are challenging the ability for our society and for debate, as 
part of that society, to achieve its potential (Smith & Voth, 2002). It is also important, though, to 
be able to laugh, whether as described by Howe or by Hariman, rather than assuming that foolish 
and exaggerated practices in debate are worthy of scorn and derision, as Davis’s essay as a whole 
performs more often than not. Indeed, as Burke (1937/1984) famously suggests, “The progress of 
human enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people not as vicious, but as mistaken” 
(p. 41). Such mistakenness is not a partisan challenge toward those with whom one disagrees, but 
an awareness that “people are necessarily mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in 
which they must act as fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness,” 
allowing one to “complete the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that 
underlies great tragedy” (Burke, 1937/1984, p. 41). Indeed, as just one illustration from a modern 
context: judging by the times when this essay’s author has introduced video clips of “speed 
reading” to undergraduate students, such moments generally tend to produce laughter, a feeling 
like such activity is foolish and a foible among these otherwise intelligent people, rather than 
derision, scorn, and anger that such practices are going to undermine democratic deliberation that 
is so seriously needed and cannot be delayed.  
 Moreover, while Hariman’s (2007) defense of Stewart is often grounded in the idea that 
his cynicism, so to speak, is deployed in relation to the flawed democratic culture it parodies and 
challenges, Davis’s approach, as described by Llano (2017), uneasily negotiates a fundamental 
tension, regarding the value of a copy when what is being copied is deeply problematic. In 
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Llano’s (2017) view, the virtue of Davis’s “counterfeit presentment” is to be found in its “idea of 
verisimilitude”: “Debate pedagogy was to be judged by how closely a contest debate resembled a 
real deliberation,” because for debate to “serve as a mode of training for citizenship in a 
democracy, it had to represent a real deliberation as closely as possible” (p. 7). In this way, the 
counterfeit transitions to the real. However, Llano (2017) also points to Davis’s model as being 
more explicitly normative, in seeing debate as a way to “teach good practices in crafting 
arguments for civil society” such that there should be “no distinction” between “‘good debate’ in 
educational settings” and “good argumentation in the civic arena” (p. 6). Though Llano (2017) 
dismisses O’Neill’s objections, saying that the counterfeit did not need to “be a copy of bad 
practices in the public sphere” but could instead “help improve the ‘real thing’” (p. 9), there 
seems to be a real risk that, should a democratic culture be flawed, debate as counterfeit may be 
too focused on reproduction of what is already present rather than offering viable counterfactuals 
of what could become a better civic space.  
Advancing Truth or Self-Risk/Vulnerability? 
While Davis advocates shifting debate from game to truth, most scholars studying arenas 
such as debate, argument, rhetoric, and communication, now reject Platonic Truth, even though 
many individuals who inhabit formal debate spaces as well as society as a whole continue to 
believe in and aspire toward this impossible achievement. Instead, it might be more useful to re-
conceptualize debate around the values and goals of self-risk and mutual vulnerability, 
transforming Davis’s “debater’s argument” into a praiseworthy model that is capable of 
cultivating democratic habits. In imagining alternative possibilities for justifying debate, 
including in times like the present moment, when polarization seems to be everywhere, and 
social media and other technologies of communication and deliberation allow people to avoid 
and in fact refuse to speak across differences, cultivating democratic habits such as encouraging 
“self-risk” might be more urgent and fruitful than trying to force a particular notion of Truth on a 
highly pluralistic, diverse culture.  
Davis’s essay seems constantly attached to a larger intellectual mission grounded in a 
Platonist conception of Truth, making it difficult to reconcile with those who have identified 
Davis’s advocacy as being in line with the project of the Sophists (Llano, 2017). For instance, he 
says that his approach “will tend to render futile brilliancy and industry, however great, when 
employed in advocating falsehood” (Davis, 1916, p. 173), which seems to read directly from 
Plato in his advocacy for dialectic as opposed to rhetoric. He also calls his approach one that 
involves a “‘search for truth’ aspect” (Davis, 1916, p. 173), and elsewhere suggests debate’s role 
to be in “converting to truth” as opposed to simply recognizing “superiority in debating” (p. 
175). Indeed, Davis (1916) disparages the gaming approach, conceding that perhaps it would be 
“superb fun,” but then asking, “But will it not be despicable? Would any of us be proud of 
having a share in producing it?” (p. 176). Such a moment recalls, in Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates 
berating young Phaedrus for enjoying the creation and hearing of speeches on love without any 
reference to whether the arguments they make tend toward the True or Good or Beautiful.  
16
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol54/iss1/4
Debate as Cerebral Gymnastics 
Page | 86 
The examples of Davis’s reliance on a truth-centered model for debate could extend 
indefinitely. The point is that this model is one that many in the newly formed academic 
discipline (at that time, of public speaking and speech) would have already rejected, and one that 
most would be even more wary of now. A Platonic foundation for academic debate reduces 
debate to eliminating error and falsehood in the pursuit of discovering and uncovering Truth, in a 
way not dissimilar to Vatz’s (1973) observation that the objectivism in Bitzer relegates rhetoric 
as a discipline to the bottom of the academic ladder. Such an approach begs the question as to 
why public speaking, rhetoric, debate, and argumentation are even necessary, and why they 
cannot already be accounted for by philosophers.  
Debate could offer an underpinning that did not rest on notions of objective Truth claims. 
For instance, the work of two debate luminaries, Wayne Brockriede (1972) and Douglas 
Ehninger (1970), proposed that argumentation and debate should be about self-risk and 
vulnerability toward one’s co-arguer. Dowling (1983), building on Brockriede’s three-fold 
metaphor structure of arguer as rapist, seducer, or lover, suggests that the former two approaches 
are far too common in debate. By incorporating Brockriede’s insights, Dowling (1983) “provides 
forensics educators with valuable guidance in improving the development of competitive 
debaters” (p. 237). Perhaps these dangerous tendencies as revealed in the approaches of rapist 
and seducer, rather than gaming itself, might better characterize the situation for which debate 
should feel compelled to change, just as inappropriate humor, rather than humor itself, might 
better focus our conversation about improving debate and its possibilities. Howe (1982) notes, in 
his call for humor and “wit” in debate, that such tactics should be enjoyable for all involved and 
“not be embarrassing or personally derogatory to anyone in the room” (p. 2). Therefore, the 
combination of self-risk and wit/humor help to create a situation whereby weaknesses of debate 
in its current form might be explored, thus beginning to set an avenue for reform that does not 
confine itself to the lowest hanging fruit, in this case an obsession with critiquing and 
condemning the gaming approach to debate.  
Does Gaming Justify Debate As It Is Or Can It Be Used to Challenge and Transform It? 
Davis (1916) claims that debate’s leaders should regard debate as “an improvable, not a 
finished, product” (p. 172). In Burke’s Attitudes Toward History (1937/1984), he opens by 
reflecting on his title: “Though the tendency is to pronounce the title of this book with the accent 
on history, so far as meaning goes the accent should be on attitudes” ( “Introduction,” para. 1). 
As an analogue, when talking about debate as a game, it is often assumed that the meaning of the 
word game is fixed, and that what is being addressed is whether debate as it exists now or could 
exist is or is not like a game. And this is misleading, in part because games as well as sports are 
not nearly as static and fixed as may be suggested in this equation. Even competitive, intense 
games have evolved, and in an interrelated sense, the vision of and justification for them has as 
well. Basketball has changed the shot clock’s length, football has outlawed hits to the head, 
while in baseball, where tradition is sacred and thus such a radical change was never thought 
possible, instant replay now exists. But what does this mean for the way that debate is envisioned 
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and justified, regardless of particular historical occasion, governing association, type of debate, 
or more particularly still, specific practices within any given type or tradition of debate? 
Universities always and unavoidably implicate debate, while benefiting in many ways 
from having debate programs (Hingstman et al., 2010, pp. 127-128). Debate programs, with rare 
exception, cannot and do not exist without an institutional home, one that can provide funding 
and legitimacy (Hingstman et al., 2010, p. 135). Debate, then, is closely interrelated with the 
university structure, to the point that both sides might find opportunities for mutual benefit, but 
might also instead find this relationship to be a nuisance or, at a minimum, an inconvenience at 
times (Mitchell et al., 2010). As its institutional host, universities at times make requests of what 
debate should become on their campuses (Hingstman et al., 2010, p. 137). And, the ways in 
which universities approach debate may too be “improvable and not finished,” potentially to the 
gain of debate programs and their respective universities (Louden, 2010). But to work, I would 
argue that both spheres must be seen as dynamic, unfinished, and capable of modification. When 
debate programs request higher budgets and more coaches, without any given and take, the 
implicit assumption being conveyed appears to be that debate is fixed and unchangeable, and 
thus that debate as an activity should just stick with the “status quo” (Keith, 2010, pp. 22-23). 
Universities might question why debate itself cannot change: less travel, reducing the coaching 
and card-cutting “arms race,” and/or adopting a “comprehensive” program including public 
debate, debate outreach, and debate in the curriculum (Newman, 1970). Thus, I argue that those 
in both academia and debate should see their own and each other’s practices as dynamic and 
revisable. And since those in debate have less direct access to structures of university 
administration writ large, I believe that a first step might be to work a vision of debate as being 
about self-risk and vulnerability into the way that relations with universities occur. How, then, in 
crafting justifications for debate, might the vision of debate be crafted in a way that is not purely 
internally-focused, toward fellow members of the debate community, and not already fully 
constituted/defined in terms of its goals and practices? That is, can meaningful calls for critique 
and improvement be made toward debate if debate is grounded in justifications rooted in play, 
game, sport, and fun and joy? 
In Burke’s Counter-Statement (1931/1968), he explained the reason for its title as 
follows: “We have chosen to call it Counter-Statement solely because—as regards its basic 
concerns and tenets—each principle it advocates is matched by an opposite principle flourishing 
and triumphant today. Heresies and orthodoxies will always be changing places, but whatever 
the minority view happens to be at any given time, one must consider it as ‘counter’” (p. 7). 
Though the names of the players change, and the battle lines are drawn differently, there is much 
to recommend a reading of continuity from Davis’s day to the present. While Davis (1916) 
envisioned his own argument as going against the consensus of the time, regarding the proper 
attitude toward debate, in many ways the majority opinion by scholars currently writing about 
debate appears to be that the game and/or sports metaphor for debate is problematic. For 
instance, a recent essay by Kaylor (2015) concludes that, “as a result of the game metaphor’s 
potential pedagogical problems, it should not be used as a primary way of depicting competitive 
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debate” (p. 43). Conversely, within the debate community, there may be more acceptance of this 
gaming metaphor, in terms of day to day practice if not in overarching justifications for the 
activity. In that role, it may serve as a tool of legitimation for what is already occurring in debate, 
rather than as a challenge to it. Thus, this essay takes up the challenge offered by Davis (1916) in 
the form of a double counter-statement: challenging the predominance of the critique and 
rejection of the “debate as game” metaphor in scholarship while simultaneously resisting 
debate’s adoption of the game metaphor as a justification for maintaining and continuing its 
current practices, individually or as a whole. One exemplar that makes this double move can be 
found in Jones (1994), who both makes a scholarly argument for a type of gaming, while also 
challenging debate as it is conceptualized and justified. Rather than merely legitimizing current 
debate practices, Jones (1994), after challenging competition as being merely about “winning,” 
suggests the potential to incorporate cerebral gymnastics into a debate program, without focusing 
solely on the tournament mode: 
A final conclusion regarding this study involves the possible need to rethink present 
program orientation. Programs required to justify budgets in terms of dollars spent and 
students serviced may want to explore providing non-competitive cerebral gymnastics 
opportunities as a means of attracting more students. Not long ago, I watched as two 
members of the traveling British debate team “beat up” on a good American open debate 
team, although the British team members never had competed in an intercollegiate debate 
competition. They were products of English debating “societies” which meet 
periodically, usually over a meal, to discuss and debate current events. On-campus 
activities offering cerebral gymnastics opportunities, without the required travel and 
competitive environment, might provide greater numbers of program participants for 
year-end reports. (pp. 73-74) 
Note that this justification does not require a serious, even tragic orientation to the grave 
importance of debate in society, but instead embodies more of the unending, playful spirit 
characterizing the Sophists (Poulakos, 1995). 
As this example from Jones (1994) illustrates, this essay is not meant to simply endorse 
debate in its current form. Indeed, there is much in debate that is in need of systematic reflection 
and change, though the list of such concerns is beyond the scope of this essay, just as Davis 
avoided making his 1916 essay into a comprehensive catalogue of the ills of debate at that time. 
The point of my critique is that gaming does not seem like it is or has ever actually been the 
primary cause or even a highly significant contributing factor in debate’s argued weaknesses. 
Framing debate as needing ever more serious and sober analysis, particularly by divorcing it 
from gaming, sport, and fun, seems as likely, perhaps more likely, to turn people away from 
debate rather than toward it. And a model that emphasizes playfulness and affect, including joy, 
better suggests a public sphere role and relevance and attractiveness for debate. Conversely, 
writing out of public discussion those who would be the equivalent of spectators in the stands of 
mass sporting events is ultimately justification for technocratic rule by the few, if one decides 
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that people will not or cannot engage “intelligently and confidently the serious questions which 
from time to time arise” (Davis, 1916, p. 179). The question, then, facing those invested in 
debate, as competitor, judge, coach, and/or debate scholar, is whether they want people to come 
back to watch and participate in academic and/or societal debate, and if so, which mechanism is 
most likely to produce that change? Perhaps such inquiry might begin by observing that the 
problems of debate might spring from the ways in which it has potentially become banal, 
untheorized, and decontextualized, and that what is identified as “gaming” is more a reflection of 
that highly insulated model.  
Returning to this essay’s start, perhaps what matters, and what is needed, is for debate to, 
in the words of Butler (2001, 2005), give an account of itself as a way of justifying debate in and 
to society. A gaming or sports accounting of debate, if executed well, could be persuasive, such 
as with the focus on cerebral gymnastics as a guiding justification for the activity. And perhaps, 
in exonerating the spaces of game, play, and sport, it might be possible and even desirable to stop 
ceding the space for such activities in a democratic culture such that they get taken over by 
primetime television, including news networks, passing off some of the truly slimy as if it 
adequately embodied any of academic debate’s conceptions of debate and argument and rhetoric. 
There are many ways to account for debate’s goals and purposes in the 21st Century, and the 
possibility need not be ruled out, in advance, that game and sport could operate persuasively in 
debate’s favor without cheapening it or causing it to go forever off course. As Sutton-Smith 
(1980) has argued, there may be much more possibility and richness to gaming and play than has 
been previously admitted:  
[R]ecreative behaviour is a cultural domain more likely to be open to change. . . . a 
people’s play is a commentary on their kind of society and their management of that 
society. It tells us . . . about our own contradictions and compromises. At the same time it 
gives us imagined solutions. . . . Gathering people together into larger communities for 
festivals and games may generate the kind of community feeling, which is later 
institutionalized in a more enduring way. At the very least it is a commentary on our 
desire. When different groups celebrate together . . . they bring to their lives the kinds of 
vividness which we have earlier called play or flow. These have in them the seeds of a 
life which is more interesting and more connected in an age when many of the older 
forms of connection no longer seem so available or so meaningful. (p. 10) 
Thus, gaming and play, understood as sites of cultural longing and human community, of who a 
people has been and who they could and would like and aspire to be, creates an open space in 
which questions can be asked and explored that could radically re-make and re-mobilize 
democratic and civic space. Rather than dismissing such a large sphere of human activity and 
becoming out of hand, those invested in debate, as a formal academic, intercollegiate set of 
practices, or in debate, as a way of societal exchange in the public sphere, would do well to make 
use of the spaces of play and gaming in order to argue for an academic activity and a democratic 
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society more in line with their visions of the joyous and the just than what is available in the 
current moment and what was available for Davis in 1916 as well.  
Debating the “Serious Affairs” of the Day: Must We Be So Serious? 
 Were one to grant, following Davis, that the vital affairs of the day demand that debate 
serve as a positive force in engaging in democratic discussion and decision-making regarding 
current events of momentous importance, does this indicate that the proper attitude must be 
somber, angry, and/or serious as regards the importance and role of debate, rhetoric, and 
advocacy? I would argue, based on insights from other arenas of social activism, that we should 
not pin our hopes on this strategy, that is, on treating the serious seriously. Indeed, social justice 
activist and writer Michael Albert (2002/2015a) opens his advice to would-be advocates by 
invoking a comparison to games, and more specifically, sports, by arguing, “We might not like 
it, but we, too, have to try to win just like professional athletes do. That’s the currency of success 
in social struggle” (p. 324). Despite the many serious issues that he argues must be addressed by 
those advocating for social and economic justice, or perhaps because of it, Albert (2002/2015b) 
specifically calls attention to the vital function of joy and levity if the revolutionaries he seeks to 
empower are to succeed in their instrumental goals:  
Trying to revolutionize society because it is fun is no joke. That is to say, if social change 
isn’t fun, the probability that people will keep trying to do it through hard time and over 
the long haul is vastly reduced. So, it’s actually important that people are engaged in 
activism because it’s preferable to doing other things, which means again that we need a 
movement that does not involve perpetually going through a gauntlet of debilitating 
criticism that makes us feel rotten. Not that we can’t be critical when appropriate, but we 
can’t allow life in the movement to be so depressing that it’s worse than working in a 
factory. Life in the movement can’t be more boring, more negating, than life out in the 
real world. If we have a movement like that, what is the probability that it’s going to win? 
(pp. 328-329)  
The purpose of this essay is not to provide a blueprint for what debates filled with fun would 
look like. That is most likely dependent on the particular context and moment in which any given 
debate occurs. Instead, my overriding argument, in analyzing Davis alongside other possible, 
potential and imagined, visions of and justifications for debate, is that those enunciating such 
visions and defenses should consider couching the activity in a framework of joy and “cerebral 
gymnastics” rather than exclusively as something meant for the very serious tasks of attending to 
the grave state of democratic deliberation with serious approaches to engaging one another. Not 
only does a playful, joyous, and gaming-inflected model of debate affect who seeks to 
participate, and thus who constitutes the community, but it also suggests a vision for debate in 
democratic society that offers an alternative to being and becoming ever more serious and even 
tragic about those serious issues facing society.  
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